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Law-and-Economics Approaches to Labour
and Employment Law
Stewart J. SCHWAB*
This article describes the distinctive approaches that law and economics takes to labour and
employment law. The article distinguishes between ‘economic analysis of law’ and ‘law and
economics’, with the former applying economic models to generally simple legal rules while the
latter blends messier institutional detail with legal and economic thought. The article describes
three eras of law-and-economics scholarship, recognizing that economics teaches that markets work
and markets fail. Era One emphasizes that labour laws and mandatory employment rules might
reduce overall social welfare by preventing a benefit or term from going to the party that values it
most highly. Era Two emphasizes that labour and employment laws might enhance overall social
welfare by correcting market failures arising from monopsony power, externalities, public goods,
asymmetric information, information-processing heuristics, and internal labour markets. Era
Three uses empirical methods to referee between markets-work and markets-fail approaches.
The article argues that unequal bargaining power is not a standard market failure, because even
powerful employers have a profit-maximizing motive to provide benefits, such as vacation or
safety, that workers are willing to pay for.
1 INTRODUCTION
Law and economics has been a distinct methodology within labour- and
employment-law scholarship for nearly forty years, even though the field was
one of the last areas of law to which law-and-economics scholars gave sustained
effort. In this essay I describe some of its distinct features. Following this introduc-
tion, section 2 starts with terminology, including a possible distinction between
‘law and economics’ and ‘economic analysis’. It then sketches the history of law
and economics generally, separating it into era one (markets work), era two
(markets fail), and era three (empirical studies are needed to referee between eras
one and two). These eras help explain why law and economics took a while to
come to labour and employment law. Section 3 introduces a stylized example of
mandatory vacation leave to illustrate economic analysis of employment law, and
then describes the American tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy (WDVPP) to illustrate a grittier law-and-economics analysis of legal
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doctrine. Section 4 outlines some of the core concepts of the law and economics of
labour and employment law. Section 5 briefly discusses the empirical turn in law-
and-economics labour- and employment-law scholarship. Throughout, I will
mainly refer to American law for examples – for the humble reason that
American law is what I know best and therefore might be of most assistance to
the reader, even though one of the attractions of economic analysis is that it can be
applied across legal borders.
2 TERMINOLOGY AND BOUNDARIES
Let me start by defining the scope of the field.
2.1 LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT, AND WORKPLACE LAW
At its broadest, our subject matter includes all legal regulation affecting the
workplace. This includes specific statutes like those prohibiting employers from
discriminating against employees on the basis of race or sex (title VII), or laws
mandating safety guards on workplace machines (Occupational Safety and Health
Act), or laws regulating leave time (Family and Medical Leave Act). It also
includes more general laws that have specific applications to workers, such as
defamation law as it applies to employer reference letters, or the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress as it applies to a boss berating a worker, or
contract law as it applies to an employer failing to comply with its own employ-
ment manual.
Since around 1990, scholars and practitioners have distinguished between labour
law and employment law. Before then, labour law was an umbrella term covering all
laws regulating the workplace, although scholars focused on the laws regulating
unions. Increasingly since 1990, ‘labour law’ regulates unions and ‘employment law’
comprises all the other laws regulating the workplace. With ‘labour law’ no longer
covering the entire field, some scholars have suggested a new umbrella term of
‘workplace law’, but it seems this term is not yet as commonly used as the clunkier
‘labour and employment law’. I will be clunky in this essay.
Most readers of this journal have their own good grasp of the boundaries of
labour and employment law (and if they lose sleep over holes in the fences, which
Alan Bogg asserts they do not, I recommend his excellent essay in this issue on
philosophical perspectives on labour law).1 I will not further delineate the legal
boundaries, but turn to the terminology of economic analysis.
1 A. Bogg, Labour, Love and Futility: Philosophical Perspectives on Labour Law, 33(1) Int’l J. Comp. Lab. L.
& Indus. Rel. (2017).
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2.2 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
There is considerable internal debate over what economics is.2 Some say that
economics is the study of how economies function at the individual and societal
level. Others declare that economics is less about subject matter (the economy),
than about how humans make decisions, particularly how they (would) make
rational choices that maximize their welfare under conditions of scarcity. Many
economists do not bother to define economics, whether viewed as a subject matter
or a methodology, following the well-known 1930s economist Jacob Viner who
supposedly said that ‘economics is what economists do’. As Backhouse and
Medema sum up after quoting a cacophony of economists, ‘economics is appar-
ently the study of the economy, the study of the coordination process, the study of
the effects of scarcity, the science of choice, and the study of human behavior’.3
2.3 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, OR LAW AND ECONOMICS
These definitions of economics seem somewhat off point in describing economic
analysis of law, and especially law and economics, terms I will distinguish shortly.
Modern law and economics is often dated as beginning with Ronald Coase’s
article on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ in 19604 and Guido Calabresi’s article
on ‘Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’ around the same time.5 Both articles
analysed fundamental aspects of property and tort law.
Coase introduced law-and-economics analysis by assessing how rational actors
would respond to a change in a specific law. In his famous example, Coase
compared an enclosure versus a free-range law–that is, he compared how cattle
ranchers and corn farmers would fare when the law required ranchers to pay
damages to farmers for corn trampled by escaping cattle, versus when the law
found the ranchers not liable. The resulting Coase Theorem declared that, when
no transaction costs prevented ranchers and farmers from bargaining, the same
amount of cows and corn would exist under either law. But Coase’s real message
was the importance of studying transactions costs and how they inhibited efficient
bargains.
Law and economics proceeded from this basic framework in many directions.
It expanded in the scope of legal doctrines, from core private-law doctrines like
contract, property, and tort law out to procedure, corporate law, constitutional
2 For a recent discussion, see R. E. Backhouse & S. G. Medema, Retrospectives: On the Definition of
Economics, 23 J. Econ. Pers. 221 (2009).
3 Ibid., at 221, 222.
4 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
5 G. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961).
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law, and beyond – including rather late in the game, labour and employment law.
Law and economics also expanded in methodological sophistication, from basic
concepts like rationality and social efficiency to market failures arising from asym-
metric information, public goods, and cognitive heuristics.
With a broad brush, one can paint three eras of law and economics. In the first
era, scholars emphasized that markets work. A well-functioning market enhances
trade so that resources go where they are most valuable, thereby maximizing social
welfare. An efficient law bolsters or enhances the market, often by enforcing
contracts, and the scholar’s task is to analyse how a particular law enhances or
inhibits market efficiency. In the second era, scholars emphasized that markets fail.
Markets can have monopoly, limited-information, public-goods, or other pro-
blems that prevent resources from going to their most valued use, thereby creating
inefficiencies. The role of law often is to reduce or correct market inefficiencies.
These two eras often clashed with competing models showing that markets work
and do not work. This led to a third era, empirical testing of economic models.
Theory and counter-theory can only go so far, and facts on the ground are needed
to resolve many debates about the effects of law.
2.4 THE TIMELINE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Law and economics was relatively slow to cover labour law, and even slower to
cover employment law. A few scholars made forays in the 1970s, with more
sustained analysis coming in the 1980s and later. This growth is illustrated by
the various editions of Richard Posner’s classic Economic Analysis of Law. Posner
published his first edition in 1972. It was a tour de force demonstrating how
economic analysis could be applied to specific doctrines in an amazing range of
legal fields. Posner’s first edition included a puny six-page ‘Note on Labor Law’
(out of 395 total text pages, or 1.5%), dealing only with labour unions as
monopolies.6 The second edition in 1977 expanded to a full eleven-page
chapter (2% of the total text pages) on ‘The Regulation of the Employment
Relation’, still mostly dealing with labour unions but also analysing minimum-
wage, workplace-safety, and anti-discrimination laws.7 By the latest edition in
2014, Posner’s treatise had continued to expand the attention given to employ-
ment law both absolutely (thirty-six pages), relatively (3.5% of all pages), and in
scope of topics, adding a discussion of employment at will, the labour-market
failures for judicial law clerks, mandated benefits, and pension law.8 Even by
6 R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 133–138 (1st ed., Little Brown 1972).
7 R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 239–249 (2d ed., Little Brown 1977).
8 R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 427–462 (9th ed., Wolters 2014).
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1990, enough scholarship existed that I could write a survey article on ‘The
Economics Invasion of Labor Law Scholarship’.9
The early law-and-economics analysts focused on labour laws regulating
unions. Perhaps they were slow to the field because, at first blush, in an era that
emphasized that markets work and laws should promote efficiency, there seemed
little to say about laws protecting unions and promoting collective bargaining other
than that the laws were inefficient. Unions were viewed as monopolists restricting
labour supply, doing their best (with the help of law) to raise wages above
competitive levels. Like other monopolies restricting supply, unions inefficiently
prevented mutually beneficial bargains between those workers willing to work at a
lower wage (now unemployed by the union monopoly) and employers willing to
hire at those lower wages.
Of course, a careful economic analysis can probe the consequences of specific
labour-law doctrines, even accepting the basic premise that the law condones or
even fosters monopoly unions. Work in the 1980s by Thomas Campbell10 and
Douglas Leslie11 took this approach and usefully increased our understanding of
secondary boycotts, appropriate bargaining units, and the like.12
The 1980s saw scholars apply the second-era theme of market failure to labour
law. In particular, law-and-economics scholars applied the brilliant insights from
labour economists Freeman and Medoff that unions had two faces (to paraphrase
the title of their 1983 book).13 One face was the traditional monopoly role
whereby unions restricted labour supply, benefitting their members by
raising wages but inefficiently limiting jobs. But the other face was an efficiency-
enhancing role that emphasized that unions could enhance voice, solving public-
goods problems in the workplace rather than relying on market-based exit. The
workplace has many local public goods. A paradigm example is the factory line that
can run at only one speed for all workers rather than be tailored to individual
worker preferences. A union bargaining with management, representing the med-
ian worker, may reach a more efficient speed in ways that a non-unionized
workplace, relying on exit of workers, cannot.14
Ironically, just as the academic economists and lawyers were exploring this
efficiency face of unions, the economic clout of unions was plummeting. In the
9 S. J. Schwab, The Economics Invasion of Labor Law Scholarship, in Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of
the IRRA 236–242 (B. D. Dennis ed., 1989).
10 T. J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 Stanford L. Rev. 991 (1986).
11 D. L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 Va. L. Rev. 353 (1984).
12 For a more recent take, see M. L. Wachter, The Striking Success of the National Labor Relations Act,
37 Reg. 20 (2014).
13 R. B. Freeman & J. L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (Basic Books 1984).
14 See K. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 419 (1992)
(exploring how various labour laws can help this efficiency-enhancing role of unions).
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United States membership in the private sector plummeted from the 1950s high of
28% to the 1980s level of 20% to the nadir of 6% today. Unions and labour law
may have an important efficiency-enhancing role in theory, but in practice it was
swamped by other factors making private-sector unions of increasingly limited
relevance. The continuing strength of public-sector unionism is its own topic of
analysis for labour lawyers and economists. A core explanation is that governments
are monopolies in their products, and unions can force a sharing of monopoly gains
with their worker/members, thereby maintaining the support that is lacking in the
private sector where globalization has demolished many product monopolies.
Law-and-economics scholars increasingly turned to employment law. Some
used what I am labelling the era-one approach to show how background law could
enhance the salutary effects of efficient markets. An example here is Richard
Epstein’s well-known defence of the at-will employment rule as helping sort
workers into their most-productive positions.15 In a nutshell, Epstein argues that
the at-will rule allows employers to fire unproductive workers without the expense
required in a just-cause regime, preventing inefficient shirking by workers, and
that good workers are protected by the profit-maximizing incentives of employers
to keep productive workers even if they could be arbitrarily fired. Other scholars
used an era-two approach that justified law as overcoming market failures.16
Among the many examples here are scholars suggesting that the anti-discrimina-
tion laws, even while interfering with employer freedoms, could enhance overall
efficiency.17
More recently, employment law-and-economics scholars have turned to era-
three empirical testing of hypotheses. Theory demonstrates how markets might
work or fail, or demonstrates how laws might bolster market efficiency or are
needed to correct market failure. But theory merely generates hypotheses. Data are
needed to reject or not reject these hypotheses. To take just one example, many
have hypothesized that the erosions of the at-will rule in various American
jurisdictions have increased employer costs and thereby reduced employment.
Autor et al. attempted to empirically test this hypothesis by comparing state
employment rates over time with the adoptions of at-will exceptions, finding a
15 R. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984).
16 See S. J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 Mich. L. Rev.
8 (1993); S. L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and
Empiricism, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 101 (1988).
17 S. J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics vol. 3, 572–595
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds, 3d ed., Edward Elgar 2000); R. H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv.
L. Rev. 1003 (1995); J. J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1411 (1986); S.
J. Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 228 (1986).
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moderate negative effect.18 I leave to others (including the essay in this issue by
Zoe Adams, Parisa Bastani, Louise Bishop, and Simon Deakin) to more fully
analyse empirical studies of labour and employment law.19 My major point here
is to note that, while scholars of many methodological stripes are interested in the
empirical turn in labour- and-employment-law scholarship, law-and-economics
scholars are especially amenable to empirical legal studies.
2.5 CONTRASTING LABOUR ECONOMICS WITH LABOUR LAW AND ECONOMICS
Labour economists might smile or cringe (depending on their individual tempera-
ment) at my myopic dating of the labour-law-and-economics field from the 1970s.
Labour economics was a well-established branch of economics for centuries before
that. Indeed, one of the central insights of Adam Smith at the dawn of economics
was about labour economics. In his famous pin-factory example, Smith emphasized
the productivity advantages from specialization by workers in a factory setting.
Some workers can specialize in the heads, others in the shaft, and overall they can
produce many more pins than workers making the entire pin individually.20 This is
an economic study of labour markets, but not a study of labour law. Other labour
economists, ranging from J.R. Commons to Hank Farber, do study the effects of
law on labour markets. The range of studies on the effects of minimum-wage laws
is a clear example.
No sharp line separates a labour economist from a labour law-and-economics
scholar. The former usually has an office in the economics department of an arts
and sciences college, and the latter in a law school. Labour economists are generally
comfortable with crunching data to test hypotheses. Indeed, labour economists
were among the first to apply modern econometrics methods to study their field.
Some labour law-and-economics scholars have engaged in empirical studies, but
not as extensively as labour economists. They almost surely have analysed labour-
or employment-law doctrine in granular detail, while labour economists examine
the law from a loftier viewpoint. But there is more to the distinction.
The distinction can be framed by contrasting the labels ‘economic analysis’ of
employment law and ‘law and economics’ of employment law. Many scholars see
no substantive difference between the two labels, and I confess I treated the terms
as synonyms until learning of Geoffrey Miller’s helpful distinction.21 Economic
18 See D. Autor, J. J. Donohue III & S. J. Schwab, The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, 88 Rev. Econ. &
Stat. 211–231 (2006).
19 See especially Z. Adams, P. Bastani, L. Bishop & S. Deakin, The CBR-LRI Dataset: Methods, Properties
and Potential of Leximetric Coding of Labour Laws , 33(1) Int’l J. Comp. Lab. L. & Indus. Rel. (2017).
20 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations book I.1 (1776).
21 G. P. Miller, Law and Economics versus Economic Analysis of Law, 19 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 459
(2011).
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analysis brings the principles and reasoning of economics to examine the effects of
a law or legal doctrine. Law and economics, as the name suggests, combines both
legal and economic modes of thought, and perhaps even prioritizes law by non-
alphabetically listing it first. Law brings ‘the understanding of complex institutions,
politics, and social policies’ to the analysis.22 In our context, an example might be
the comparison between Card and Krueger’s economic analysis of minimum-wage
laws23 and Shaviro’s law-and-economics analysis.24 Prominent economists Card
and Krueger empirically examined the unemployment and income-distribution
effects of minimum-wage laws, including gathering their own data on fast-food
restaurants in New Jersey and neighbouring Pennsylvania before and after New
Jersey raised its minimum wage. Card and Krueger found that raising the mini-
mum wage, contrary to the standard economic theory, often increased employment
or had no effect. Shortly afterwards, prominent law professor Daniel Shaviro also
assessed the minimum wage, using a framework that compares taxes, government
spending, and regulation, and compares in detail minimum-wage laws and a host
of tax and welfare policies including the earned income tax credit. Shaviro
criticizes Card and Krueger’s conclusions,25 but that is not the point of my
distinction. Rather, my point is the difference in style and range of analysis brought
to bear, ideally in a mutually reinforcing way. As Miller concludes in comparing
the approaches (using a different example than Card/Krueger versus Shaviro), the
law-and-economics methodology ‘makes the task messier and more complicated
[than economic analysis] but also potentially richer and more revealing’.26
3 TWO EXAMPLES
A general discussion of the law and economics of employment law can quickly
become overly abstract or general, so in this section I give two concrete examples
to illustrate the style of thinking. The first is a simple, stylized sketch of workers
and employers interacting over a wage-benefit package. It illustrates a basic
economic analysis of mandatory vacation-leave law. The other example puts actual
common-law cases of WDVPP into an economics frame, illustrating a law-and-
economics analysis of employment law.
22 Ibid., at 460.
23 D. Card & A. B. Krueger, Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage (Princeton
University Press 1995).
24 D. Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 405 (1997).
25 Ibid., at 405, 406.
26 Miller, supra n. 21, at 459, 465.
122 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
3.1 STYLIZED EXAMPLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY VACATION LAW
Suppose a widget factory pays its workers wages and can also give paid vacation
leave (perhaps responding to a legal mandate). The economic question is what
amount of vacation is optimal – in the sense of maximizing total social welfare or,
equivalently in this example, the welfare of workers as perceived by the workers
themselves.27
In this stylized world, widgets sell for 1 each (the denomination can be dollars,
euros, yuan, pesos, or whatever). If workers work year-round without vacation,
each worker produces 900 widgets per week, or 46,800 widgets per year. See
Table 1, row 0, columns 3-4 (ignore the salary and profits columns for a moment).
Table 1 Stylized Example of Employer and Employee Valuation of Vacation Benefits
(1) Weeks of
Vacation
(2) Total
Value of
Vacation to
Worker
(3) Weekly
Output
(4) Annual
Output: (3)x
[52-(1)]
(5) Annual
Salary:
[Negotiated]
(6) Profits
to Employer:
(4)-(5)
0 0 900 46,800 35,000 11,800
1 2,000 1,000 51,000 36,000 15,000
2 3,200 1,000 50,000 34,900 15,100
3 3,900 1,000 49,000 33,800 15,200
4 4,400 1,000 48,000
As the industrial engineers can show for this stylized industry, a week’s vacation
increases worker productivity by allowing healthful rest and recuperation. With a
week of vacation, each worker produces 1,000 widgets during each working week,
rather than merely 900 without a vacation, or 51,000 widgets per year. See row 1,
columns 3 and 4. Thus, even accounting for the week without work, a week’s
vacation increases total productivity for the year.
Increasing vacation beyond a week does not further increase weekly produc-
tivity, however. With one or more weeks’ vacation, workers produce the same
1,000 widgets each workweek. But workers want more vacation. Indeed, each
worker would be willing to pay (or, equivalently, accept a lower salary) up to
1,200 for a second week of vacation, compared to their salary with a single week of
27 For an empirical study of the tradeoffs between wages and vacation, see J. G. Altonji & E. Usui, Work
Hours, Wages, and Vacation Leave, 60 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 408 (2007).
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vacation–perhaps using this second week to visit their mother. Each worker also
values a third week of vacation (to visit their uncle, say) at up to 700–not quite as
much as they value the second week visiting their mother. A fourth week is still
valuable (to visit their teacher, we teachers can hope), but marginally less valuable.
No one in this widget industry has ever considered more than four weeks’
vacation, so our chart stops there.
Now suppose the annual salary for Employer 0 (offering no vacation) is
35,000. Why this particular salary? For now we simply assume it comes from
bargaining between employer and worker, and the exact amount is somewhat
arbitrary. The employer is willing to pay this amount because it earns a profit (of
11,800) that it would not receive without the worker. Of course the employer
would prefer a lower salary, just as the worker would prefer a higher salary, but the
bargaining set it here. The worker is willing to work here because this is better
than other available alternatives. Later we can discuss more precisely the important
detail of how salaries are set, and in particular examine differences between a
single, monopsonist employer and many competitive employers.
Let us compare Employer 0 and Employer 1. Employer 0’s contract with no
vacation is less efficient, because both employer and employee would prefer a
contract calling for one week’s vacation and a salary of 36,000. Workers prefer this,
because it has a higher salary and more vacation. And Employer 1 also prefers it
because profits are higher. Thus a law mandating one week’s vacation improves
efficiency by making both parties better off than a situation of no vacation. What
an easy comparison–everything is higher with a one-week vacation mandate,
including vacation length, weekly output, annual output, salary, and profit. Both
parties directly benefit from a week of vacation. What an uncontroversial, efficient
law! But what a trivial law, because both employer and worker would agree to one
week of vacation even without a legal mandate.
Comparisons are slightly less obvious between Employer 1, offering one week
of vacation, and Employer 2 offering two weeks of vacation. If the salary were to
remain the same, the worker would prefer Employer 2, but investors would prefer
Employer 1. A stalemate. But notice that the worker gains more by a second week
of vacation (1,200) than the employer loses (1,000 in lost annual output). This
allows for a trade that makes both parties better off. Compared to the Employer 1
contract, both employer and worker prefer a contract that reduces the salary
somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200 and calls for two vacation weeks.
A law mandating that employers provide at least two vacation weeks again
improves efficiency, but again the law is unnecessary. Both employer and worker
would agree to a second week of vacation, even without the legal mandate. This
time, the agreement comes not because both sides directly benefit from the extra
124 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
week of vacation. Rather, because gains exceed losses, the worker can compensate
the direct harm to the employer by accepting a lower salary, and still be better off.
The comparisons change between Employers 2 and 3, because now the cost of
the third vacation week (1,000) exceeds the value to the worker (700). The parties
have no mutually acceptable deal with three vacation weeks that both prefer to
two weeks. No salary/three-week-vacation contract exists that both employer and
worker would prefer to their 34,900/two-week contract.
The law could still mandate three weeks of vacation, but that would be
inefficient. The inefficient law makes workers (and employers) worse off, because
workers would prefer a contract with less vacation and more pay, and employers are
willing to offer that contract if the law did not forbid it. If a three-week law stays in
place, Employer 3 will reduce salaries compared to Employer 2 by at least 1,000.
3.1[a] Lessons
What are the lessons from this stylized example of economic analysis of a mandated
vacation law? First, notice the simplicity of the economic reasoning. Equating
marginal cost and benefit is the concept lurking behind the example, but that
jargon need not be express. This example is very much in the style of Ronald
Coase’s 1960 pathbreaking economic analysis of how farmers and ranchers would
respond to laws allowing open range versus placing liability on cattle trampling
crops.28 Coase often explained his economic arguments through simple examples
like this, and eschewed ‘blackboard economics’ or ‘mathematical jargon’.
Second, ‘value’ is the key element in the illustration –with value being defined
as willingness and ability to pay. For the employer, each week of vacation beyond
the first costs 1,000 in lost output. Cost is the opposite of value, so the employer
values each vacation week at -1,000 (i.e., the employer would be willing to pay up
to a smidgen less than 1,000 in extra wages to avoid the worker taking another
vacation week). For the worker, the value of each vacation week comes in the
form of willingness to accept a lower salary. Later, when I discuss some of the
subtleties behavioural economics has introduced to the economic analysis of
employment law, we can examine how workers may react differently to giving
up a week of vacation versus bargaining to get another week of vacation. This is
often characterized as the difference between the maximum willingness to pay to
get something versus the minimum willingness to accept to relinquish something.
The current illustration finesses this willingness to pay/accept distinction by fram-
ing the labour market as having various employers offering different salary/
28 Coase, supra n. 4.
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vacation packages to beginning workers, and workers gravitating to the package
they most prefer.
Third, the example shows that an efficient employment contract maximizes
the total valuation by both sides to the contract. In Table 1 above, the efficient
contract is offered by Employer 2, maximizing the total value of vacation to the
worker measured by the worker’s willingness and ability to accept a lower salary
(column 2) plus the total value of the output (column 4). Row 2 maximizes this
sum. An efficient contract (the largest pie) can make both parties better off than
any smaller pie, with an appropriate cutting of the slices.
Fourth, an efficient employment contract allocates each item to the party that
values it most highly. Here, the two items are vacation weeks and money. Workers
value week two of vacation more than employers do, while employers value weeks
three and four more than workers do. So the efficient contact allocates vacation
weeks one and two to the worker, and weeks three and four to the employer.
However, no efficiency gains come from raising or lowering wages. Each side is
willing and able to pay up to a dollar for a dollar, and thus each side values a dollar
equally. No efficiency gains or losses come from making the wage higher or lower
by itself, without trading off other items. (I assume here that the number of
workers and weekly work hours are fixed.)
Fifth, the example shows that employers will sometimes provide benefits even
without a legal mandate. Labour-law scholars sometimes overlook this simple
point. Even with no statute mandating vacation, employers in our example will-
ingly offer two weeks. It is often unnecessary for the law to mandate an efficient
result.
Sixth, the example suggests only a limited role for law. This stark example
makes a number of assumptions, including the core Coasean-world assumption
that transaction costs are not large enough to prevent efficient bargaining. We are
also assuming a background legal system that enforces employment contracts–so
that workers get their wages and bargained-for vacation, and employers get the
surplus profits. With these assumptions, an employment law mandating up to two
weeks’ vacation is trivially unnecessary, in that the parties would agree to the
contract without the specific employment law. On the other hand, a law mandat-
ing ‘overly generous’ three or more weeks’ vacation is not trivial but is inefficient,
in that workers are worse off with the law than without it.
Finally, if we consider transactions costs, the role of law can be larger. An
efficient law can reduce transaction costs by setting a presumption based on what
most parties would want–a ‘mimic the market’ strategy. In our example, if law-
makers are sure that two weeks is the optimal amount of vacation, they can
mandate this level and save the parties the costs of bargaining over vacation pay.
If workers and firms vary in their valuations, however, the law might do better by
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creating a presumption of two weeks based on what most parties want, but
allowing the parties by individual contract to agree to a different amount. By
choosing what most parties want, this saves transaction costs for most parties. If the
law-makers cannot determine what most parties want, another possible default rule
could be based on relative transaction costs.
3.2 THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE TORT OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
The prior example had highly stylized facts, ideal for economic analysis. Let
me now describe the messiness of a common-law doctrine and see if a law-
and-economics framework can help us understand it.
WDVPP is an American tort, arising from the backdrop of the American
default rule of employment at-will. Law-and-economics scholars have debated the
efficiency merits and demerits of the at-will rule.29 I will not rehearse the argu-
ments here, so for purposes of the illustration I will not attack the wisdom or
efficiency of at-will employment by itself. Rather, I intend to briefly sketch cases
in which employees asked courts for a tort exception to at-will employment.
Courts sometimes adhered to the at-will rule and rejected their claims, but some-
times accepted the claims, creating the common-law tort of WDVPP. The ques-
tion is whether we can give a law-and-economics account of this tort, explaining
both the winning and losing cases.30
Consider these cases. In each case, the employment is at-will, which we can
think of as an express agreement whereby the employer agreed to a higher wage in
return for the legal right to fire for any reason without court scrutiny.
(1) An employee is fired for refusing to commit perjury when the
government investigates the employer for racketeering. Judgment:
employee wins.
(2) An employee is fired for absenteeism after being called for jury
duty. Judgment: employee wins.
(3) A bartender employee is fired for refusing to serve beer to an
intoxicated customer. Judgment: employee wins.
29 See Epstein, supra n. 15; W. Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the
Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1953 (1996); Schwab, supra n. 16, at 8;
J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just
Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 837 (1995).
30 For a more extensive analysis of this question, see S. J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for
Third Party Effects, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1943 (1996).
LAW-AND-ECONOMICS APPROACHES 127
(4) A sailor is fired for refusing orders to illegally dump bilge water
into the harbour or for reporting the illegal dumping by co-
workers. Judgment: employee wins.
(5) A bank employee is fired for telling the bank’s executives that the
police are investigating his boss for embezzlement. Judgment:
employer wins.
(6) An employee is fired for punching back when a co-worker attacks
the employee. Judgment: employer wins.
(7) An employee is fired for showing up late for work after being in a
car accident. Judgment: employer wins.
(8) An employee is fired after her estranged husband beats her off-
work, because the employer wanted to avoid dealing with the
situation. Judgment: employer wins.
These are snippets from eight of the thousands of cases alleging WDVPP. Some
observers find the court judgments to be a confusing cacophony. Worker-rights
advocates root for the worker in each case. But some order is visible if we
remember two principles of the law and economics of contracts and torts: First,
contracting parties themselves are generally best able to assess their own interests
and decide what employment contract furthers their interests, with the court’s
primary role being to enforce but not second-guess the parties’ intentions. Second,
a central purpose of tort law is to force parties to internalize the adverse con-
sequences of their conduct on third parties.
The ordering principle, then, is whether the firing has direct third-party
effects. Of course, every firing harms the employee and thereby harms society.
But the harms to others are indirect, through the harm to the employee. We can
assume that the employee considered the pros and cons to the employee of at-will
employment when accepting the contract. Therefore a court will not step in and
reset the bargain when the dispute is merely between employer and employee. But
when the court sees direct harm to third parties from the employer curtailing the
employee’s actions, it upholds the employee’s claim.
Third-party effects occur in cases (1)–(4). Not only does the firing harm the
employee and the employee’s family directly, but it also directly harms the rest of
us by encouraging perjury, limiting the jury pool, increasing drunk driving, or
polluting the harbour.
By contrast, cases (5)–(8) do not have direct third-party effects. The bank
employer in case (5) may get less information about its workers, but the rest of us
are harmed only if that harms the bank. Resolving a fight between co-workers
incorrectly (case (6)) does not directly harm the rest of us. In case (7), the court
considered that the employee in a car wreck risking dismissal by showing up late
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for work might not seek immediate medical attention, and that delayed medical
attention might increase medical bills that the rest of us subsidize. But this seems
remote rather than direct. Even in the appalling facts of case (8), the rest of us are
harmed by the battered wife being fired only through the harm to the wife, not
direct harm to an outside-the-workplace interest.
This law-and-economics explanation of a tort doctrine is messier than the
stylized economic analysis of vacation benefits presented earlier, and would be still
messier if I discussed outlier cases. Its ordering principle distinguishes between
private and public spats, itself a hugely controversial if not incoherent divide. The
rule cannot explain every decision, but can help explain both employer and
worker victories by focusing on the efficiency goals of tort law.
4 KEY CONCEPTS IN THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
With the two illustrations in hand, let me make some more general remarks about
the methodology of law and economics of employment law.
4.1 THE RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION
Rationality is a core assumption of law and economics, as it is for economic analysis
more generally. Economic models generally assume that actors know their prefer-
ences and make choices that maximize their overall welfare (synonymous with
utility), based on these preferences. Be they individuals, corporations, labour unions,
or whomever, actors respond to the law’s sanctions like they respond to other
constraints, by choosing actions that maximize their welfare subject to the constraint.
The job of the economic analyst is to predict how rational actors will respond to a
law (and, ideally, the analyst completes the job by testing empirically whether the
prediction is correct–but more on empirical studies at the end of this essay). In our
simple vacation example, we assumed that our worker knows how much utility he
gets from a week’s vacation and rationally chooses between vacation and the utility
he would get from higher pay.
The rationality assumption is controversial and often misunderstood. Personal
reflection shows that no one always rationally chooses actions that maximize their
wellbeing. Greed, envy, lust, rage, and other passions block rational decision-
making, along with limited information, biases, and heuristics. But economists
do not view this as a fundamental criticism of their methodology. First, rational
decision-making is a prediction that itself can be tested empirically. Economists
generally admire parsimonious models with simple explanations, even when they
do not capture every nuance or variation of human behaviour. Economists are
LAW-AND-ECONOMICS APPROACHES 129
suspicious of ‘thick’ explanations that by trying to be all-encompassing create
mushy stories that cannot be falsified. Second, economists have fruitfully studied
passions and incorporated them into broader models of rationality, by showing
how passions help humans maximize their long-run utility by, for example, using
rage to convince others to keep their promises to the enraged actor even when it
would not be rational in the short term for the enraged actor to retaliate.31 Third,
economists can incorporate insights from behavioural psychology (rebranding
them as behavioural economics) to include rules of thumb and other heuristics as
part of human decision-making.32
4.2 MAXIMIZING SOCIAL WELFARE
Moving from the rationality assumption of individual decision-making, the next
key concept of economic analysis is social efficiency. This is a subtle, slippery
concept. A situation is efficient when, considering all the costs and gains to all
actors, the net gain is maximized, or equivalently when the overall harm is
minimized. In some situations, such as workplace accidents, it usually seems
more useful to conceptualize the goal as minimizing the overall costs of accidents
and avoiding accidents. In other situations, like most bargaining or contract settings
where each party hopes to gain from the bargain, it seems more accurate to
conceptualize the goal as maximizing the net gain to all parties. In either case,
the gain or cost is from the actor’s own perspective as measured by the actor’s
willingness and ability to pay for the item.
4.3 POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Many economists (but fewer law-and-economics scholars) say they are engaged in
positive analysis rather than a normative assessment. Thus, when assessing a mini-
mum-wage law, for example, they might say the law is inefficient or non-optimal,
in that it prevents employment contracts between willing workers and employers
at low wages, often increasing unemployment. Other economists suggest that
minimum-wage laws can increase employment in markets where employers have
significant monopsony power.33 Ultimately, these are empirical questions that can
and have been tested.34 But my point here is that economists on both sides often
31 See R. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (W. W. Norton & Co. 1988).
32 See C. Jolls, C. R. Sunstein & R. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev.
1471 (1998).
33 See B. E. Kaufman, Institutional Economics and the Minimum Wage: Broadening the Theoretical and Policy
Debate, 63 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 427 (2010).
34 Card & Krueger, supra n. 23.
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say they are not taking a normative position on the wisdom of the law, merely
assessing its effects.
Non-economists are rightly sceptical. The very terms ‘optimality’ and ‘effi-
ciency’ are loaded with normative connotations. Most law-and-economics scholars
take a normative as well as positive approach, and applaud an efficiency-enhancing
law and criticize an inefficient law, all else equal.
4.4 UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Law-and-economics scholars often delight in pointing out the unintended con-
sequences of a law. In our stylized vacation-benefits example, we examined
seemingly pro-worker laws mandating three vacation weeks – and why not four
or five or twenty? The economics answer is that, whenever the costs to the
employer exceed the gains to workers, mandating the benefit actually harms
workers. The unintended consequence is the lower wage. Real world examples
of unintended consequences might include the increased unemployment arising
from minimum-wage laws or from laws requiring reasonable accommodation for
workers with disabilities.
Other labour scholars too often ignore, the law-and-econ types think, these
unintended consequences. Sometimes the ignorance comes from an (often
unstated) assumption that employers will abide by laws without adapting their
behaviour to ameliorate the laws. Sometimes the assumption is that exploitative
employers have substantial amounts of money that they will simply give up when
the law forbids or taxes a practice, rather than move to other activities.
4.5 OVERALL SOCIAL WELFARE AND AGNOSTICISM AS TO WHO WINS
Most employment scholars believe they are championing workers, and use a
methodology whereby the protection of workers is and should be the prime aim
of employment law. As the prominent employment-law scholar Clyde Summers
put it in applauding the rise of employment protections (while bemoaning the
decline of collective bargaining): ‘if collective bargaining does not protect the
individual employee, the law will find another way to protect the weaker party.
The law, either through the courts or the legislatures, will become the guardian’.35
One problem with a law-protects-weak-workers framework is that it often
seems unrealistic as a positive description of politics. Who creates the law, the
weak or the strong? One possible answer is that workers are weak in economics
35 C. W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 7, 9–10
(1988).
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but strong in politics, and that is why the law (based on one person one vote, with
workers the most numerous voters) protects workers who are weak in the eco-
nomic sphere (based on one dollar one vote, with capitalists or managers having
more dollars). However, this still seems an unrealistic view of politics, where many
decry the undue influence of money.
Supporters of the law-protects-weak-workers positive claim point to laws that
seemingly favour workers, such as minimum wage laws. Even here, public-choice
theorists might argue that these employment laws favour well-paid unionized
workers who face less competition from lower-skilled workers, while harming
those low-skilled workers who become unemployed after a minimum-wage
increase.
The law-and-economics perspective takes greater issue with the normative pre-
mise of protecting weak workers, in that the protect-weak-workers premise has no
limit. That premise can only say the law is good if workers get more; otherwise the law
is bad. To return to our simple vacation example, a law-protects-workers approach
would presumably push for as much vacation as possible. But does this mean three
weeks is better than two, ten weeks is better than six, thirty weeks vacation is better
than fifteen, or that fifty-two weeks vacation is the ultimate goal of employment law?
At some point, workers have too much legal protection, but the law-favours-weak-
workers approach has a hard time articulating that point, even conceptually.
Law-and-economics scholars use a different measuring rod, overall social
welfare.36 It thus can articulate the stopping point for protecting workers. The
welfare of workers is important, but so is the welfare of consumers, children,
retirees, investors, and other non-workers. Humans take on all these roles. Jobs,
job growth, or protection of workers is not an ultimate goal of the good society,
but merely an important means to the goal of improving overall social welfare.
Even limiting the focus to the welfare of workers, the law-and-economics
approach can articulate the normative limits of worker protection: as part of the
goal of placing all items where they are most valued, the law should provide
workers with all the vacation, safety, and other conditions that workers are willing
to pay for (in a well-functioning labour market without market failures, a subject I
take up soon).
4.6 FOCUS ON MONEY AND COMMENSURABILITY
Many critics complain that law-and-economics scholars focus on money or mate-
rial goods, ignoring issues of dignity, fulfilment, and self-worth that work can
36 For a vigorous defence of law and economics’ use of social welfare, see L. Kaplow & S. Shavell, Fairness
versus Welfare (Harvard University Press 2002).
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provide. This complaint misunderstands law and economics. Laws and economics
counts as valuable anything that a worker values. For example, suppose a worker
chooses job 1 over job 2, where both offer the same salary but job 1 offers more
autonomy, dignity, or opportunity for meaningful work. The worker has revealed
that he or she values the non-material aspects of job 1, and thus job 1 is more
valuable. Indeed, many labour scholars have revealed that they prefer the (mostly
non-material) benefits of their jobs rather than higher paying (but more onerous)
law-firm jobs.
The law-and-economics approach does insist that everything has its price,
including a fulfilling job. Every decision has pluses and minuses. Workers (like all
economic actors) weigh and choose in every action they take. Even doing nothing
(be it not going to college, declining a promotion, not moving to a new job with
greater voice, not going to union-hall meetings, or whatever) is itself a decision. In
the law-and-economics method, all things are commensurable. Law-and-econ
scholars recognize these comparisons are often difficult, but it is what people do
in their lives. To throw up one’s hands and say the comparison cannot or should
not be made denies what real workers do and must do every day.
The centrality of trade-offs in all aspects of life was emphasized by the Austrian
school of economists. As Friedrich Hayek said, it is ‘an erroneous belief that there
are purely economic ends separate from the other ends of life.’37 Corey Robben
has nicely summarized Hayek’s thinking about tradeoffs38:
Everything in life, and not just in the economy, is a trade-off. If I wish to devote myself
entirely to philosophy, I must forgo the violin. I cannot be a child of God and a man of the
world. Whatever we seek and care about in life requires a sacrifice from us: of time, effort,
focus, and, most important, other options. That finitude we experience–that something
can only be had at the expense of something else–is part of the human condition. This
needn’t be a source of sadness. For it is only through that sacrifice of ourselves, that
enforced trade-off of other possibilities, that we learn what we truly believe and value.
Hayek recognized that trade-offs were as important for workers as consumers, and
that some choice in jobs is critical so that a worker is ‘not absolutely tied to a
particular job which has been chosen for us, or which we may have chosen in the
past’.39 Hayek, of course, was railing against a planned socialist or fascist economy.
He conceded that there is ‘much that could be done to improve the opportunities
of choice open to the people [as workers]. Here, as elsewhere the state can do a
37 F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 89 (U. Chi. Press 1976) (originally published 1944).
38 C. Robin, White State, Black Market: The Capitalism of Clarence Thomas 20 (unpublished manuscript
Nov. 2016). See also C. Robin, Wealth and the Intellectuals: Nietzsche, Hayek, and the Austrian School of
Economics, in Hayek. Part V, Hayek’s Great Society of Free Men: a Collaborative Biography Ch. 4
(Robert Leeson ed., U. Chi. Press 2014).
39 Hayek, supra n. 37.
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great deal to help the spreading of knowledge and information and to assist
mobility’.40 I do not intend to push Hayek too far, for his influence on the law
and economics of employment law has been, at most, deep background. His
celebration of the wealthy41 and his hostility to trade unions42 in particular are
not shared by many law-and-econ scholars. But Hayek’s basic point that trade-offs
between ‘economic’ and other items is central to understanding labour markets,
and markets generally, is important. Law-and-economics analysis does not relegate
itself to economic items or money alone.
4.7 SCEPTICISM OF REGULATION
Some think that the law-and-economics approach is anti-regulation and anti-
government, advocating for a laissez-faire approach to labour-market regulation.
This characterization is understandable but unfair.
True, the law-and-economics approach criticizes some laws that purportedly
favour workers. Which ones? The inefficient ones in which the costs to society (or
to workers) exceed the gains to (some, or perhaps the same) workers. My stylized
three-weeks-vacation law illustrates an inefficient regulation. Many economists
think a USD 15 minimum wage would be another example of over-regulation.
Most law-and-economics analysis of this type is stage-one, emphasizing the power
of markets and the harm of over-regulation.
But law-and-economics endorses much employment regulation–namely, the
regulation that promotes overall efficiency. Generally, law-and-economics scholars
endorse laws that correct market inefficiencies.
A further irritation even here is that law-and-economics scholars warn against
the Nirvana fallacy that compares the inefficient messiness of a real market with the
idealized intervention of a costless legal regulation, rather than the real-world
messiness of government regulation.43 But this warning is apt, and often ignored
by labour-law scholars. Under-regulation (for example, the at-will rule) leads to
bad consequences in the real world, but so does over-regulation (for example, a
40 Ibid., at 95.
41 See Robin, supra n. 38.
42 B. Jackson, Hayek, Hutt and the Trade Unions, in Hayek. Part V, Hayek’s Great Society of Free Men:
A Collaborative Biography Ch. 5 (Robert Leeson ed., U. Chi. Press 2014).
43 R. H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 24 (U. Chi. Press 1988) (‘the existence of “extern-
alities” does not imply that there is a prima facie case for governmental intervention, if by this statement
is meant that, when we find “externalities”, there is a presumption that governmental intervention
(taxation or regulation) is called for rather than the other courses of action which could be taken
(including inaction, the abandonment of earlier governmental action, or the facilitating of market
transactions’).
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just-cause rule that in practice means that incompetent or ill-willed workers cannot
be fired).
4.8 MARKET FAILURES
Labour markets fail in a variety of ways. Much of the most interesting law-and-
economics scholarship shows how employment laws can correct these market
failures. The stories of market failure are often more complicated than the stories
of well-functioning markets. Let me briefly tick off several ways labour markets
can fail, and how regulation can correct the market.
4.8[a] Monopsony Power
Markets work best when they are competitive, having large numbers of sellers and
buyers who are individually too small to affect the market price. A product market
is inefficient when it has a single monopolist seller or a few oligopolist sellers.
Specifically, a monopolist no longer acts as if it can sell an unlimited quantity at the
going market rate. Rather, it recognizes that it must lower the price to sell more.
To maximize profits, a monopolist reduces the quantity sold, thereby keeping the
price high. Monopolistic competition is an intermediate case where several firms
sell similar but not identical goods. In this case also, prices are set higher than
competitive levels, which is inefficient in that some consumers value the good
more highly (its marginal benefit) than the (marginal) cost of producing it, and yet
the resources go to a less valuable product.44
For labour markets and other input markets, the mirror of a monopolistic
producer is the single, monopsonist employer buying labour. Unlike an employer
in a competitive labour market, who can attract an unlimited number of workers at
the competitive wage rate, the monopsonist recognizes it can only attract more
workers by raising the wage. In the economist’s diagram, the monopsonist
employer faces an upward-sloping supply curve of labour. To maximize profits,
the monopsonist hires fewer workers at a lower wage compared to the competitive
equilibrium. This is inefficient because workers who would be more productive in
this industry than elsewhere, and who are willing to work at a wage the employer
could earn profits from, are turned away. In such situations, a mandatory minimum
wage might induce employers to hire more, rather than fewer workers.45
44 See H. R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 52–54 (W.W. Norton 1978).
45 D. Card & A. B. Krueger, Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage xi (Preface
to 20th-Anniversary ed., 2016) (noting that ‘just about every introductory economics textbook
describes the static monopsony model of the labor market, which has similar implications for the
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Economists have debated the prevalence of monopsony.46 The remote logging
camp or company town are clear examples, but relatively rare in modern industrial
economies. Undoubtedly more common is monopsonistic competition.
4.8[b] Externalities, or Third-Party Effects
An externality occurs when the workers and employer do not consider all the costs
and benefits of their agreement on others. My discussion of the tort of WDVPP
illustrated a legal doctrine designed to control externalities. The employer and
employee had agreed to at-will employment without considering the effect that
agreement might have on third parties or the public at large who are denied a full
jury pool, or a non-polluted harbour.
Transaction costs create externalities. As Coase showed in his famous article,
with zero transaction costs all persons possibly affected by a worker's or employer’s
actions could bargain for a different employment agreement that considered their
interests. This is the same idea as saying that, with zero transaction costs, all
pedestrians put at risk by a speeding car could bargain with the car to slow
down, thereby having the driver internalize all costs of speeding. But the
Coasean world of zero transaction costs is not our world, as Coase himself
emphasized.47 Some labour-law regulation, such as the requirements to collec-
tively bargain in good faith, can be seen as trying to reduce the transaction costs of
collective bargaining in order to promote efficient bargains.48
4.8[c] Public Goods in the Workplace
Some goods, called public goods, benefit other workers when given to a single
worker. Consider dangerous cotton dust in a factory. Reducing dust for one
worker reduces it for all. The level of safety is a public good. Individual bargaining
tends to produce inadequate levels of safety. Suppose one worker values lower
cotton dust, in the sense that she is willing to accept lower wages for the increased
safety. She could individually ask the employer, but a problem arises. If the request
works, every worker benefits from the cleaner factory air. But if the employer
dynamic search model that we emphasized as an explanation for many of our findings [that a minimum
wage can increase employment]’).
46 See B. E. Kaufman, Labor’s Inequality of Bargaining Power: Myth or Reality?, 12 J. Lab. Res. 151, 156
(1991) (arguing that ‘historical evidence demonstrates that monopsony conditions, at least broadly
defined, were relatively prevalent in early twentieth-century labor markets’).
47 See Coase, supra n. 43, at 174 (‘The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a
Coasian [sic] world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world of modern economic
theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave.’)
48 See S. J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 245, 266 (1987).
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instead retaliates by firing the worker, the harm from speaking up falls on the
worker alone. The individually optimal strategy may be to stay quiet and hope
someone else sticks their neck out and complains. But this may lead to safety not
being provided even when workers are willing and able to pay for it. Workplace-
safety laws may be needed to mandate more efficient levels of safety and other
workplace public goods.49
4.8[d] Asymmetric Information
Market failure can also arise when employers have less information than employ-
ees, or vice versa, creating adverse-selection problems. For example, consider two
types of workers. Each is equally productive in the workplace, but type-1 workers
have families with expensive health-care needs. Type-2 workers have families with
less expensive health-care needs. All workers value employer-provided health
insurance, in the sense that they are willing to accept lower wages that reflect
the costs of insuring their type of family. The workers know which type they are,
but employers cannot tell them apart. In this ‘lemons’ market, an employer who
offers its workers health-insurance benefits at an average wage reduction will see
type-1 workers flooding to apply, with the employer’s overall health costs exceed-
ing the wage reductions. The result is that type-1 workers may not get any
insurance, even when they value the insurance at more than it would cost
employers to provide it to them. An employment law mandating that employers
provide health insurance (or government-provided insurance) may reduce this
adverse-selection problem and be more efficient than an unregulated labour
market.50
4.8[e] Limited Information and Information-Processing Heuristics
Psychologists have long understood that people have difficulty assessing the risk of
low-probability events or events far in the future. Unfortunately, workers often
face low-probability events (such as contracting cancer from workplace exposure
to benzene) or events with payoffs far in the future (such as a pension). As a result,
the labour market might under-produce these goods, in that workers would be
willing to pay for the safety or the pension if they accurately assessed the costs and
49 See R. Edwards, Rights at Work: Employment Relations in the Post-Union Era (Brookings Institution
1993).
50 See C. Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223 (2000); L. H. Summers, Some Simple
Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AEA Papers & Proc. 177 (1989).
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benefits. A law mandating a certain level of benzene or pension payments may
increase workplace efficiency.
Many economists blanch at such laws because they smack of paternalism. Who
is better positioned to understand whether a worker is better off with higher wages
or more safety, the worker or the government? If the government is confident it is
better able to assess these choices, then who cares about the paternalism charge.
But often the government is confident in general, but less sure that its choice is
superior to the worker’s choice in every situation.
The answer might be a nudge rule, as Thaler and Sunstein have advocated in
coining this type of law.51 A nudge rule is not a mandate, but a default rule that a
worker can countermand. The default is set at what the rulemaker believes is most
appropriate for the worker, considering all the costs and benefits. For example,
consider two rules surrounding employee pension contributions. The laissez-faire
rule calls for no wage deduction into an employee’s defined-contribution retire-
ment account unless the employee specifies how much, up to say 5%, should be
deducted. It turns out in practice that many employees under such a rule save very
little for their retirement. The nudge rule, by contrast, requires that 3% of wages be
taken out and placed in the employee’s retirement account, unless the employee
specifies that more or less be taken out. It turns out in practice that employees save
much more under this nudge rule. Such a nudge rule may be more efficient (in the
sense of maximizing overall welfare for more workers in the balance between
current and retirement pay) than either a laissez-faire rule or a mandatory 3%
contribution rule.52
4.8[f] Internal Labour Markets
Many workers are in long-term career relationships with their employer. They join
an employer in one of its entry-level jobs and work their way up the internal
promotion ladder. Careers at IBM or DuPont were classic examples of these
internal labour markets. Many of the checks on exploitation that external labour
markets provide–most importantly, the ability of workers to quit and employer to
fire if things get bad–are weaker in career employment. The career employee has
obtained firm-specific knowledge and established firm or community roots that are
less valuable elsewhere, locking the employee and employer together. Wachter has
explored the implications of internal labour markets for labour and employment
51 See generally R. H. Thaler & C. R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and
Happiness (2008).
52 B. C. Madrian & D. F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior,
116 Q.J. Econ. 1149, 1150 (2001).
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law.53 He sees a great role for unions to enforce the internal workplace norms of
fair play, but finds only a limited role for employment laws that can improve the
efficiency of internal labour markets. Almost by definition, no contract can specify
the details of this long-term relationship, so Wachter concludes that courts are
poorly equipped to intervene. I have suggested that courts might usefully step in to
police the opportunism dangers that workers face near the end of their career,
especially if their compensation exceeds their end-career productivity, but courts
should not step in mid-career.54
4.9 UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER
The major overarching purpose of most employment laws, in the eyes of most
employment-law scholars, is to counteract bad market outcomes caused by
unequal bargaining power.55 While some highly skilled workers such as experi-
enced CEOs have considerable bargaining power, most workers are individually
weak. In the law-and-economics approach, by contrast, unequal bargaining power
plays a more limited role. Unequal bargaining power by itself does not create
inefficiencies, because workers without bargaining power can still receive those
goods for which they are the highest valued user. Thus, while many analysts think
of unequal bargaining power as a market failure, I discuss it separately (but
immediately after my discussion of market failures).
Unequal bargaining power is a notoriously slippery concept. Some years ago
Duncan Kennedy brilliantly dissected some of its conflicting meanings, arguing
that ‘there is little behind the notion [of unequal bargaining power] in the way of
an intelligent analysis of the general problem of equality, let alone the problem of
the quality of life under our form of capitalism’.56 Some equate unequal bargaining
power with take-it-or-leave-it offers written by a large corporation, perhaps a
monopolist, and foisted upon many weak consumers. Other conceptions add that
the item is a necessity in short supply. Workers employed by large corporations fit
this image. They struggle to find work, especially in times of high unemployment,
53 SeeM. L. Wachter, Neoclassical Labor Economics: Its Implications for Labor and Employment Law, in Research
Handbook on the Economics of Labor and Employment Law (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds,
Edward Elgar 2012).
54 S. J. Schwab, supra n. 16, at 8.
55 See G. Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law 52 (Oxford 2016) (‘While the language of market
failures is gaining some ground in recent years [ … ], the view that is still by far the most widely
accepted, throughout the world, is that which explains labour law by reference to “inequality of
bargaining power”’).
56 D. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 620 (1980).
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and rarely negotiate over terms. Guy Davidov has succinctly summarized these
ideas in the labour context:
The term ‘inequality of bargaining power’ seems to suggest that even though an employee
should get a certain wage, she is willing to work for less. Or otherwise accept terms and
conditions that she would not have accepted if she had more bargaining power. Otherwise
put: this concept suggests that the employer usually has the power to determine the wage
and the terms of employment, while the employee usually faces a ‘take it or leave it’
choice, and often has to take an unfavourable offer to make a living. But in what sense can
we say that the employee ‘should’ have received more?57
In short, Davidov says that unequal bargaining power can be a ‘shorthand for the
existence and prevalence of market failures’.58
It is unclear that take it or leave it, or big against small, implies either market
failure or unequal bargaining power. Consider consumers buying cereal at the
grocery store. Consumers cannot bargain individually, but few doubt that they can
get any type of cereal – sugared, healthy, with or without nuts – that they are
willing to pay for. Even monopolists have incentives to respond to customer
wants. If cereal producers can make money by catering to a certain type of
consumer, they will offer that brand. Similarly, a monopsonist employer has
incentives to cater to employee needs or desires.
Bruce Kaufman is the law-and-economics theorist who has most system-
atically discussed the implications of unequal bargaining power in labour markets,
especially from an institutional perspective. He also posits the major source of
unequal bargaining power with monopsony and related market imperfections.
Kaufman defines unequal bargaining power as the power of an employer (or
symmetrically, but rarely in practice, the power of an employee) to ‘set non-
competitive wages or conditions’, a power that arises when employers are not the
wage takers of competitive-market theory but face upward-sloping labour supply.
Upward-sloping supply arises from fewness of firms, limited worker mobility, or
differentiated workers. This occurs with monopsony, a well-recognized type of
market failure creating inefficiencies.59
57 G. Davidov, supra n. 55, at 52.
58 Ibid. Davidov continues that unequal bargaining power can also refer to the fact that ‘due to the
previous allocation of resources in society, [an employee] has to accept the first offer made to her–
unlike the employer, she does not have the ability to wait (or ‘hold out’ of the market) for any
significant period.' Ibid., at 53. Davidov also explains that ‘[a]n entirely different meaning does not
concern bargaining over the terms of the contract, but rather refers to the existence of subordination–
the agreement of the employee to submit herself (to some degree) to the control of the employer’.
Ibid.
59 B. E. Kaufman, Labor Law and Employment Regulation: Neoclassical and Institutional Perspectives, in Labor
and Employment Law and Economics 3, 15–16 & 30–33 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Seth D. Harris &
Orly Lobel eds, Edward Elgar 2009).
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I agree that monopsony power is a market failure that allows employers to
reduce wages below competitive levels. That is why I examined it first in the
earlier discussion of market failures. But I would define unequal bargaining power
somewhat differently than equating it with an employer facing an upward-sloping
supply curve for labour.
I define bargaining power as the relative gain from trade that goes to a
particular party. Parties enter contracts, including employment contracts, because
each side prefers the contract to the next best alternative, and thus gains something
from the contract. If the employer has great bargaining power, most of the gain
goes to it and little to the worker.
Return to our stylized example of vacation pay. Week 2 of vacation costs the
employer 1,000 in lost production, but the worker values it at 1,200 – meaning the
worker would be willing to give up to 1,200 in wages. An employment contract
with two weeks’ vacation increases total value by 200. How much of the gain goes
to the employer versus the employee depends on the relative bargaining power. If
the employer has great power, wages will fall by almost 1,200. If the employer has
little bargaining power, the wage will fall by barely 1,000.
Bargaining power is related to the economic concept of ‘rent’–which for
labour markets can be defined as the difference between the actual wage and the
employer’s or worker’s next best alternative. Suppose a widget worker’s next best
alternative is as a farmer making 100 (often termed the reservation wage). The
additional revenue an employer can get from this widget worker (the marginal
revenue product) is 200. Thus, as I have defined this situation, the worker is
willing to work here for any wage more than 100, and the employer is willing to
hire for any wage lower than 200. Suppose the parties settle on x between 100 and
200, which depends on the relative bargaining power. The employer’s rent from
this transaction is 200-x, and the worker’s rent is x-100. The greater the employ-
er’s/employee’s rent, the greater its relative bargaining power.
In this conception, bargaining power can arise even in competitive markets.
In the standard competitive supply-and-demand model, everyone but the last
(marginal) worker is paid more than their reservation wage and less than their
marginal revenue product, creating rents on both sides.
The key question is whether an employer’s greater bargaining power leads to
inefficient labour markets. More specifically, will an employer’s bargaining power
prevent workers from getting all the terms and conditions that they value more
than the employer does? The answer, in general, is no.
In asserting this, I sharply distinguish the wage (or, more generally, the overall
cost to the employer of the employee’s compensation package) from the particular
terms and conditions of employment–ranging from vacation to safety levels to
workplace voice to dignified work. The employer with bargaining power has the
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ability and profit motive to lower the compensation package. Thus, in the standard
monopsony model the compensation and employment level is inefficiently low.
But the employer does not have a similar profit incentive to lower every
workplace benefit. Quite the contrary. Given a particular overall compensation
cost (which the employer with bargaining power will drive low), the employer
wants to provide the mix of wages and benefits that employees value most highly.
By providing this surplus-enhancing benefit, the employer can exploit workers all
the more, by enlarging the pie and using its huge bargaining power to cut an even
larger slice for itself. In other words, large employer bargaining power does not
imply that the labour market will not give workers value-enhancing benefits. In
our vacation example, even a monopsonist will offer a second week of vacation,
reducing the wage by nearly 1,200, and increasing its profits compared to offering
only a single vacation week.
Some readers might be wondering how this assertion fits with the well-
accepted notion that monopolies are inefficient. True, a monopsony labour market
with one employer and many workers hires inefficiently few workers. Unlike an
employer in a competitive labour market, who can hire as many workers as it
wants at the competitive compensation level, the monopsonist employer is not a
‘compensation taker’. Rather, the monopsonist employer recognizes that it must
raise compensation if it wants to hire more workers. The monopsonist maximizes
profits by keeping compensation below competitive levels, even at the cost of
hiring fewer workers. The low compensation discourages some workers from
working in this industry even when they are more productive here than elsewhere.
These workers are not willing to work at the low monopsony compensation but
would be willing to work for a higher compensation that the employer could still
find profitable, but for having to raise compensation for all others. In technical
terms, these workers are willing to work for compensation less than their marginal
revenue product in this industry, but the monopsonist will not hire them if it
requires raising compensation for all.
Once the monopsonist has set the size of its workforce (below the efficient
number) and its overall level of compensation (below the competitive level), it still
has a profit-maximizing incentive to provide the efficient wage/benefit combina-
tion to workers. A monopsonist loses profits if it fails to provide benefits that its
workforce is willing to pay for. Better to reduce wages still further (even below the
low level a monopsonist offers without benefits) by adding benefits that workers
value. There is no necessary connection in the economics of labour markets
between bargaining power and the failure to provide benefits.
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5 THE EMPIRICAL TURN
Perhaps my major point has been to emphasize that the law-and-economics
approach is not inherently against legal regulation of labour markets. Economists
have two lessons: labour markets work, and labour markets do not work. Labour
and employment laws can enhance efficiency by bolstering the smooth operation
of markets and by correcting market failures. The law-and-economics method
provides a perspective or framework for assessing when employment laws are likely
to enhance or inhibit efficient markets, though ultimately these are empirical
questions.
Economists have increasingly emphasized empirical analysis in recent
decades.60 As Card and Krueger recount,61 in many economics articles from the
1970s and 1980s ‘the empirical analysis was clearly secondary to the main theore-
tical point of the paper’. This began changing in the late-1980s,62 and labour
economists were leaders in emphasizing empirical, data-crunching methods to test
hypotheses, ranging from the unemployment effects of minimum wage laws to the
determinants of retirement age.
The empirical mindset within the legal academy is more recent, although its
antecedents go back to the legal realists 80 years ago or more. But today law
scholars from various perspectives are turning towards empirical studies for
guidance.63
Empirical evidence is particularly salient for law-and-economics scholars ana-
lysing employment laws, precisely because of how easy it is to point to theory and
counter-theory suggesting that a legal doctrine promotes or inhibits efficiency.
What is needed, by both law-and-economics and other employment scholars, to
move our understanding forward is a willingness to make falsifiable arguments, an
interest in figuring out whether the argument is true or false, and a healthy
indifference to whether the ultimate conclusion on a particular point favours
labour or management. Let the data speak.
I leave to other essays in this conference issue a fuller discussion of empirical
methodology in labour and employment law, and simply say that the law-and-
economics methodology applauds the empirical turn.
60 See D. S. Hamermesh, Six Decades of Top Economics Publishing: Who and How?, 51 J. Econ. Lit. 162
(2013).
61 Card & Krueger, supra n. 45.
62 See J. D. Angrist & J.S. Pischke, The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research
Design is Taking the Con out of Econometrics, 24 J. Econ. Perspectives 3 (2010).
63 See M. Heise, An Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990–2009, 2011 U.
Illinois L. Rev. 1739 (2011).
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6 CONCLUSION: ONE VIEW OF THE CATHEDRAL
Economic analysis can apply to everything, far beyond conventional markets with
money prices. Supply and demand in the criminal market, the marriage market,
and the market for legislation are standard fare. The imperial nature of economic
analysis can understandably irritate outsiders.
Most law-and-economics scholars, however, appreciate the sub-title of one
of Guido Calabresi’s most famous articles, One View of the Cathedral.64 The
law-and-economics lens gives a valuable perspective, but it is only one view. As
Dean Calabresi explains, quoting an earlier Yale Law Dean, the
law-and-economics perspective is just one of many ways to analyse law. The
impressionist Claude Monet provided over thirty paintings of the cathedral at
Rouen, in different lights and hues. To understand the cathedral, one cannot
look at just the perspective from one painting. So too with the law and
economics of labour and employment law.
64 G. Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
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